A key climate policy question is how to balance low-cost emission reductions from land-based activities available in the near term with investments to drive technological innovation in energy, industry, and other sectors over the medium to long term. This paper uses a global climate-energyeconomy model to investigate the implications of linking Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) credits to a global carbon market, with a focus on the consequences for technology innovation in the energy sector. Deforestation mitigation lowers the total costs of a policy to stabilize emissions at 536 ppmv of CO 2 -equivalent by an estimated 10-25%, depending on the policy scenario. Alternatively a global REDD program enables additional reductions of about 20 ppmv with no added costs compared to an energy-sector only policy. These cost savings entail modest tradeoffs in terms of reduced clean energy innovation overall, with small positive effects on the development of some technologies, including carbon capture and storage. Moreover, while reduced clean energy innovation could in principle handicap future efforts to reduce global emissions, this analysis suggests that the availability of REDD helps in net terms to preserve climate policy flexibility. The synergy between REDD and credit banking provides a head start on climate mitigation that is an aggregate hedge against potentially higher costs due to unexpected future increases in the stringency of climate policy. Integrating REDD into global carbon markets could thus lower policy costs and facilitate more ambitious climate policies now and in the future. 
Introduction
While there is broad agreement that policies to reduce emissions from tropical deforestation should be part of global strategies to combat climate change, the linkage of international forestry and other land sectors to compliance markets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions remains a critical policy issue. Policies for Reducing Emissions from tropical Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) offer the opportunity to mitigate a major share of global GHG emissions at low estimated costs based on existing technologies (Stern 2008) . Investments in REDD are also a potentially attractive "wooden bridge" for reducing near-term emissions while buying time to reengineer other sectors of the economy (Chomitz 2006) . A key policy question is how to balance funding of low-cost emission reductions from tropical forest conservation and other land-based activities that are available in the near term with investments to drive technological innovation in energy, transport and industrial sectors over longer-term periods. This paper uses a global climate-energy-economy model to investigate the implications of linking REDD credits to a global carbon market, with a focus on the consequences for technology innovation in the energy sector. We also evaluate the implications for policy flexibility when future emission reduction targets are uncertain and an unexpected tightening of climate policy might be needed in coming decades in response, for example, to new scientific information about climate change impacts.
While the framework for limiting greenhouse gases under the Kyoto Protocol excluded mechanisms to reduce deforestation, there is growing consensus on including REDD as a critical element of a future global climate policy regime. The Copenhagen Accord of December 2009 calls for immediately establishing a mechanism to finance REDD and other forestry sequestration activities in developing countries (UNFCCC 2009 ). The Accord specifically calls for exploring both public and private market-based financing approaches, but the details remain to be determined. Governments and other organizations have put forth multiple proposals for financing REDD activities, including marketbased approaches with different degrees of fungibility between forest carbon credits and GHG reductions in other countries and sectors. 4 Policymakers in the United States are also considering multiple means of financing international forest carbon activities within emerging regional compliance markets for GHG reductions as well as in recent legislative proposals for a cap-and-trade system at the Federal level.
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Under a carbon market system, mitigation of tropical forest emissions, perhaps measured at a national scale against a reference level of historic emissions, would generate credits that could be sold and traded in a market for GHG emissions permits ('allowances') that could be used to satisfy legallybinding emissions control obligations. Such an approach offers the potential to channel resources to the most cost-effective mitigation opportunities, lowering the costs of climate policies and generating significant financing for REDD over the near term. One set of concerns is that linking international forest carbon credits to GHG compliance markets could lower near-term costs at the expense of reductions in developed countries and associated incentives to develop critical low-carbon technologies.
Concerns over the potential of REDD credits to "flood" compliance markets and dampen clean technology innovation have been largely voiced with regards to the scale of potential forest carbon credits relative to the size of the European Union's existing Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) market.
For example, the European Commission cited a potential "imbalance" between the supply and demand for REDD credits as one of the reasons for its recommendation to defer the inclusion of REDD from the EU ETS at the end of last year (EC 2008) . The availability of low-carbon technologies could be important as a hedge in the event, for example, that new scientific information requires a downward revision of climate targets in the future (Tavoni, Sohngen and Bosetti 2007) . On the other hand, 4 Parker et al. (2008) provide a user-friendly guide to the most recent and influential proposals for REDD, including the alternative financing options, while Parker et al. (2009) focus specifically on the financing alternatives. 5 The American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R.2454) passed by the House of Representatives in June, 2009 sets an absolute limit of 1-1.5 billion tons per year on the allowed use reduced deforestation and other international mitigation credits from uncapped nations, although these "offsets" would be subject to a 20% discount after 2017. The bill includes a "strategic allowance reserve" that allows additional use of deforestation reduction credits if the carbon price hits particular levels. The bill also dedicates 5% of allowance auction revenues to fund additional international forest carbon activities.
researchers have argued that relatively modest investments to preserve tropical forests could also generate additional near -term emissions reductions that could help preserve flexibility for achieving more ambitious emissions reductions that may be needed in the future ( et al. and Greenberg 2009a) .
We conclude that concerns over REDD discouraging technological innovation are largely misplaced. Reducing the costs of climate change protection by steering efforts into the lowest marginal cost options for mitigation is precisely the economic rationale for an emissions trading system, providing a net gain for society as whole as long as the right long-term emissions reduction targets are in place. Furthermore, the interaction of REDD and banking helps cushion the risk of unanticipated higher costs when there is less than perfect anticipation of increases in future emission-reduction targets. Of course, if there is a concern that forest carbon credits will be too plentiful, policy makers always have the option of limiting the numbers allowed in the system and it is surprising that this has not been taken up by the EU in its revised ETS proposals. At the same time we should not lose sight of the costs of excluding REDD from the carbon market: doing so risks making climate change protection policies unnecessarily expensive and misses important opportunities to enable political agreement on more stringent GHG reduction targets now and in the future.
Previous studies of the impacts of global forests on climate stabilization, carbon markets, and technological innovation
A growing literature analyzes the potential role of reductions in deforestation and other landbased mitigation activities as part of global climate change policies. Researchers have estimated that forest-sector emission reductions, largely in the tropics, would contribute half as much abatement as the total energy sector under an economically optimal strategy that balances the costs versus the benefits of avoiding climate change (Sohngen and Mendelsohn 2003) . Previous studies using integrated economy-climate models have focused on the potential contribution of forestry and other land-based activities to a least-cost portfolio of mitigation options for achieving a particular target level of GHG concentrations. In particular, results from the Energy Modeling Forum 21 at Stanford University and related efforts indicate that reducing deforestation, as well as afforestation/reforestation, changes in forest management, and agricultural activities to sequester carbon and reduce emissions, can play a significant role in meeting stabilization targets and reducing the costs of climate policy over the next century Fisher et al. 2007 ).
Apart from differences in modeling details, the estimated savings from REDD critically depend on the modeled policy target for GHG concentrations in the atmosphere and on the menu of options for reducing emissions that are available under each policy scenario. More mitigation alternatives bring more potential sources of low-cost emission reductions, reducing the reliance on any single source of cost savings. Another critical assumption affecting the estimated role of REDD across models is the expected development of future bioenergy technologies. In particular, biomass production for electricity generation combined with carbon capture and sequestration could, in theory, be a powerful competitor for land to mitigate greenhouse gases if it became a feasible means to generate energy with negative carbon emissions (e.g. Obersteiner et al. 2001) . At the same time, studies have also shown that policies to reduce emissions from fossil fuels could create perverse incentives that increase emissions from deforestation as bionergy crops expand if parallel incentives are not in place to avoid emissions from land use (e.g. Mellilo et al. 2009; Wise et al. 2009; Edmonds 2003) .
To the extent that policies to reduce forestry emissions lower the costs of climate protection, REDD may enable greater global emissions reductions than could be achieved without REDD for the same overall policy cost. For example, an analysis coupling the World Induced Technical Change
Hybrid (WITCH) model of the energy sector and climate system with the Global Timber Model (GTM) of the forestry sector indicates that forestry mitigation enables an atmospheric target of 550 CO 2 parts per million by volume (ppmv) 6 for the same total cost as a 600 ppmv target without forestry mitigation 6 A stabilization level of 550 ppmv CO 2 only (corresponding to about 650 ppmv CO 2 equivalent, depending on assumptions regarding non-CO 2 gases) would result in minimal chances of meeting the frequently discussed 2.0°Celsius limit on average global temperature rise above preindustrial levels. The stabilization target considered in the present paper is 535 ppmv CO 2 eq (roughly 450 ppmv CO 2 only). Again, at these concentration levels, depending on the sensitivity of the climate system, the likelihood of meeting the 2.0° C target is low. While current attention is thus focused on even more stringent goals, we (Tavoni, Sohngen and Bosetti 2007) . The estimated net cost savings of US$2 trillion (40% of policy costs in discounted terms) could finance an estimated additional 0.25°C less warming by the end of the century at no added cost compared with energy-sector only reductions. These cost savings come, however, with an estimated delay in energy-intensity reductions of the global economy. Based on the induced innovation feature of WITCH, the authors also find that in meeting the emissions reductions target, forestry crowds out some of the abatement in the energy sector for the first two to three decades, with later deployment of carbon capture and storage on coal plants from 2015 to 2030 and a lower share of nuclear power. They also estimate that in the case with versus without forestry, energyintensity R&D investments fall by 10% and there is lower learning-by-doing, which delays the decline of wind and solar energy costs.
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Such integrated assessments of the contribution of the forest sector to global climate stabilization policies (e.g. Rose et al. 2008) have, in general, abstracted from the institutional details of how national commitments would be structured and how emission reductions would be traded in a carbon market system. Studies have focused on the economically efficient pattern of mitigation, assuming that the optimal trajectory to stabilize emissions is followed by all countries starting immediately. A more realistic pattern of participation across regions results in an economically sub-optimal global path of emissions. In particular, delayed participation by developing countries and other regions misses lowcost mitigation opportunities in the near term and causes international leakage (shifts in emissions) that increase the need for more costly future emission reductions in order to achieve climate targets (e.g.
Calvin et al. 2009).
More recently, studies using partial equilibrium models have examined the impacts of including forest carbon credits within a carbon market given different scenarios of negotiated national-level emission reduction commitments and potential restrictions on trading. All these studies find that choose this more moderate target because it has received wide attention in the policy arena and provides greater scope for analyzing the technology implications of linking REDD to a carbon market system, as discussed in section 3. 7 As in the present analysis, "energy-intensity R&D" refers to research and development investments to foster improvements in energy efficiency in both the electric and non-electric sectors.
including forestry mitigation significantly lowers policy costs in these circumstances. when both reduced deforestation and forestation credits are included. They also estimate that forestry credits from developing countries would lower the European Union's carbon price in 2020 by 4% to 41%, depending on whether the EU commits to 20% or 30% reductions below 1990 levels by 2020 and on the modeled 'supplementary limits' (i.e. the proportion of credits from non-Annex I countries that are permitted in the ETS).
Recent studies have examined the potential carbon-market impacts of REDD in a dynamic framework that includes the possibility of credit 'banking.' When long-term targets are sufficiently ambitious and anticipated, regulated entities have a potential incentive to over-comply with current requirements and bank excess allowances or other types of credits for use in later periods when allowance prices be higher, as is likely the case with tightening commitments to reduce emissions (Dinan and Orszag, 2008; Murray, Newell and Pizer, 2009 ). When banking is active, the estimated emission reductions and path of carbon prices are generally higher in the near term and lower in the long term compared to a scenario without the flexibility to trade emission reductions across time.
Taking banking into account, assuming national commitments consistent with a stabilization target of about 550 ppmv CO 2 equivalent, and using marginal abatement cost curves from the Global to 2050. Also including credits from afforestation/reforestation and changes in the management of timber plantations would reduce the price by a total of 31% and 43%, respectively, over this period.
Similarly including banking and using recent forestry cost estimates from GTM, a dynamic analysis with the ADAGE and NEMS models reports similar results on REDD; including tropical deforestation credits could lower allowance prices by an estimated 18% while also including A/R plus forest management lowers prices by a total of 42% (USCAP 2009).
REDD credits could affect carbon price volatility as well as price levels. Piris-Cabezas and
Keohane (2008) argue that a reservoir of banked REDD credits could provide firms with a buffer against unexpected price spikes and volatility in the future. In addition to banking, option contracts based on available sources of low-cost abatement, such as REDD, could provide an alternative form of flexibility to help hedge against carbon market volatility (Golub et al. 2009 ). Golub et al. (2008) examine the potential market for REDD-backed call options that a buyer could choose exercise at a future date to purchase REDD credits at an agreed upon price, depending on the carbon prices prevailing at that time. Such transactions could provide an alternative source of near-term financing for REDD programs while allowing carbon market participants to hedge firm-level risks associated with permit price spikes. Moreover, such options could buy time and flexibility for the development of new energy technologies such as carbon capture and storage (Golub et al. 2008 ).
Key features of this analysis
Our analysis marries advantages of integrated assessment studies with the institutional and policy realism of recent partial-equilibrium carbon market analyses. We build upon Tavoni, Sohngen, and Tavoni, Sohngen, and Bosetti (2007) . Consideration of induced technical change is critical for assessing the value of forestry mitigation as a "bridge" to facilitate the transition to a future low-carbon economy. We model how REDD alters incentives through the carbon market and how these, in turn, affect technology innovation and deployment in the energy sector over time. In contrast, previous studies of linking forest-based credits to carbon markets take future technologies and abatement costs as fixed.
Second, our study is intertemporal and dynamic, which is essential for modeling how technological change evolves endogenously. The dynamic model also allows us to explore the impact of a market framework in which participants can 'bank' credits in anticipation of more ambitious emissions cuts in the future. This likely feature of carbon markets has significant implications for the timing and pattern of abatement across forestry and other sectors.
Third, WITCH is an integrated assessment model linking the economy and the climate. Rather than only examining the market impacts, the link to the climate allows consideration of how the predicted patterns of mitigation affect GHG concentrations and the associated climatic implications.
This enables explicit analysis of the costs of meeting stabilization targets, as well as the degree to which cost savings from forest carbon mitigation can enable more ambitious stabilization objectives.
The climate module also allows us to examine alternative estimates for the costs of reducing emissions from deforestation while accounting for differences in the projected business-as-usual levels of future emissions from global forests. Accounting for varying trajectories of forest emissions is essential for evaluating the role of global forests in meeting stabilization targets. We also use the integrated assessment framework to examine the role of reductions in deforestation under different scenarios on how stabilization policies might evolve over time.
Overview of the paper
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 describes the WITCH model and the alternative sources of supplemental data on the marginal costs of reducing tropical deforestation. Section 3 presents our policy scenarios, based on a global program for stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at 550 ppmv of CO 2 equivalent. We also explore the implications of alternative estimates of REDD supply, the availability of banking, and the need to make midcourse corrections in the climate stabilization policy. In section 4, we report and discuss the results on the impacts on deforestation, policy costs, carbon prices, financial flows among countries, and especially investments and R&D in clean energy technologies and the implications for policy flexibility.
Section 5 concludes and identifies areas for future research.
The WITCH Model and the Forestry Estimates
The analysis is performed by supplementing an optimal growth integrated assessment model (WITCH) with cost curves for reducing tropical deforestation estimated by different forestry and landuse models. Most integrated assessment models such as WITCH do not directly examine avoided deforestation and other land-use mitigation activities but they can be linked to forestry and land-use models. Previous studies have used both 'soft' and 'hard' link approaches to examine the potential of land-based activities in climate stabilization (see Rose et al. 2008) . We take a 'soft link' approach, augmenting the WITCH model with estimates generated by separate land-use and forestry models under carbon price scenarios that are consistent with the WITCH model predictions.
While Tavoni, Sohgnen, and Bosetti (2007) iterated between WITCH and a forestry model to increase consistency, we draw on the results that by now are available from a broader set of forestry and land-use models. This 'soft link' approach, without a complete integration of models, has the advantage of preserving the full richness of the modeling on both the energy and forestry sides. The disadvantage is that it does not capture potentially significant feedbacks between the energy and forestry sectors as well as with other economic sectors and the overall climate system. Integration of forestry and other land uses within economy-wide models is an ongoing area of climate policy research (see Hertel, Rose and Tol 2009 for an overview), including consideration of trade effects (Golub et al. 2009b ) and feedbacks between climate change and agricultural productivity (Ronneberger et al. 2009 ).
Our approach uses WITCH to focus on the energy sector and technology innovation impacts and then explores the sensitivity of results to alternative estimates from the separate forestry and land-use models.
Climate-energy-economy model
The WITCH model (Bosetti, Carraro et al., 2006 ) is a climate-energy-economy model designed to assist in the study of the socio-economic dimension of climate change. It is structured to provide information on the optimal responses of world economies to climate damages and to identify impacts of climate stabilization policy on global and regional economic systems. HFC with long lifetime, PFCs, and SF 6 ) 9 . SO 2 aerosols, which have a direct cooling effect, are also accounted for. Since most of these gases are determined by agricultural practices, which are not modeled in WITCH, we rely on estimates for reference emissions and a top-down approach for mitigation supply curves. Land-use CO 2 emissions are also exogenous (see below for a detailed description of non-energy CO 2 emissions). Abatement costs curves are included and mitigation strategies in these other gases are endogenous in the model. A three-box model is used to mimic the carbon cycle and a simple relationship translates CO 2 concentrations into radiative forcing ( WITCH is a hybrid model because its description of the economy and energy systems combines features of both top-down and bottom-up models: the top-down component consists of an intertemporal optimal growth model in which the energy input of the aggregate production function has been expanded to yield a bottom-up description of the energy sector. The model provides a fully intertemporal allocation of investments in energy technologies and research and development (R&D) that is used to evaluate optimal and second-best economic and technological responses to different policy measures.
9 For the baseline projections of non-CO2 GHGs, we use EPA regional estimates (EPA, 2006) . The regional estimates and projections are available until 2020 only. For the later periods, we use growth rates for each gas as specified in the IIASA-MESSAGE-B2 scenario, which has underlying assumptions similar to those in WITCH. SO 2 emissions are taken from MERGE v.5 and MESSAGE B2. Given the very large uncertainty associated with aerosols, they are translated directly into the temperature effect (cooling), so that we only report the radiative forcing deriving from GHGs. In any case, sulphates are expected to be gradually phased out over the next decades, so that eventually the two radiative forcing measures will converge to similar values. 10 http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg1/pdf/tar-06.pdf, Table 6 .2, first Row.
Countries are grouped in 12 regions that cover the world and whose strategic interactions are modeled through a dynamic game. 11 The game theory set-up accounts for interdependencies and spillovers across regions of the world, and equilibrium strategies reflect inefficiencies induced by global strategic interactions. This allows the analysis of fully cooperative equilibria (for example, in the case in which all regions of the world sign a climate agreement) and partial/regional coalitional equilibria (when only a subgroup of regions signs a climate agreement or different groups of regions sign different agreements).
In WITCH, technological progress in the energy sector is endogenous, thus enabling analysis of the effects of different stabilization policies on induced technical change, via both innovation and diffusion processes. Endogenous technical change plays a critical role in the modeling of climate policies, as analyzed in detail in a recent OECD working paper based on the WITCH model (Bosetti et al. 2009 ). The model's dynamic system also accounts for feedback effects from economic variables to climatic variables, and vice versa.
the non-electricity sector, mitigation options include advanced biofuels 13 and a backstop option that can substitute for oil. Two other important mitigation options are the endogenous improvement of overall energy efficiency with dedicated energy R&D and reducing emissions from deforestation, which is discussed in detail below. R&D expenditures, investment in carbon free technologies, purchases of emission permits or expenditures for carbon taxes as well as biological sequestration credits are simultaneously evaluated at equilibrium.
Diffusion and innovation processes are modeled to capture advancements in carbon mitigation energy intensity of the economy (EN/GDP), per capita GDP (GDP/POP) and population (Kaya and Yokobori 1997) . The left part of the graph reproduces the historical components determining the GHG emissions observed over the past thirty years, whereas the right panel depicts the long-term trends projected by the model in the baseline scenario through 2100. Historically, rising per capita GDP and population have been the major determinants of emissions growth, whereas improvements in carbon intensity had the opposing effect of reducing emissions. In the long-term scenario, economic growth remains the principal driver of GHG emissions over the whole century, whereas the role of population fades over time. Population growth still contributes to the increase in GHG emissions until 2075, when global population starts to slowly decline and its impact on emissions thus becomes negative. A decrease in the energy intensity of GDP slows the growth of emissions but is not sufficiently large to compensate for the pressure of economic and population growth until the middle of the century, when total emissions begin to trend down. The carbon content of energy production remains approximately constant over time, with a slight carbonization of energy due to an increase in the use of coal in China, India, and other fast-growing countries. 
Forestry and land-use models
Given uncertainty surrounding both tropical forestry emission baselines and the costs of reducing deforestation for different regions and time periods, we consider three different sets of REDD cost curves. Each set of curves is derived from a distinct modeling framework external to WITCH. We focus on avoided deforestation (the first 'D' of REDD) for which a broad range of cost estimates is available, as this is the focus of policy discussions. By abstracting from institutional details, transaction costs, and other real-world complications, these models estimate the theoretical potential of reducing deforestation emissions but likely understate the true economic costs of reducing deforestation emissions in practice. Greater REDD supply provides greater scope for detecting the potential suppression of key technologies, such as carbon capture and storage, often deemed strategically important in climate change policy discussions.
One set of supply curves comprise the estimated compensation needed to cover 30 years of opportunity costs of reducing deforestation emissions in the Brazilian Amazon based on modeling from the Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC; Nepstad et al. 2007 ). 14 This analysis integrates spatiallyexplicit partial-equilibrium models of potential land rents from soy, timber, and cattle ranching together with a simulation model of future deforestation considering expected road development and protected area scenarios. While only one out of many potential participating countries in a global REDD program, Brazil accounts for up to one half of global deforestation in the humid tropics (Hansen et al. 2008) , and has the most developed current infrastructure for monitoring and implementing REDD. In Given Brazil's institutional capabilities, expressed commitment to reducing deforestation, and marketdevelopments supporting low-deforestation agriculture, Brazil-only REDD is potentially a realistic scenario for near-term REDD potential (see Nepstad et al. 2009 for more discussion). Nevertheless, the Woods Hole Research Center's modeling does not account for potential 'leakage,' shifts in deforestation from the Brazilian Amazon to other parts of the world, as a result of deforestation 14 These opportunity costs are greater than the necessary government budgetary costs estimated by the authors. A 30-year payment for opportunity costs is assumed to be sufficient to achieve a permanent reduction in deforestation emissions.
reductions in Brazil's Amazon region. As a result, these estimates will likely understate the costs of achieving global emissions reductions by means of a REDD program limited to the Brazilian Amazon.
We also consider two estimates of the global potential for reducing deforestation emissions, based on a scenario in which all tropical forest nations immediately join a carbon trading system and have the institutional and governance capacity to fully implement deforestation-reduction programs. In reality, countries vary widely in both their willingness and ability to reduce and monitor deforestation.
The global model estimates simulate an idealized forest carbon policy in which any changes in the modeled stocks of forest carbon relative to business as usual are continually rewarded or penalized in full according to the prevailing carbon market price. In practice, a global REDD system could provide a less comprehensive set of incentives, thereby discouraging participation by some nations. Fewer sources of mitigation and greater potential for international leakage would undermine the effectiveness of reductions achieved in any particular location and further increase the costs of reducing deforestation emissions. 15 The global models thus estimate the maximum economic potential for reducing deforestation emissions under an optimal REDD system.
The global REDD estimates used for this study are from two of the leading economic models of global forests, based on scenarios for rising carbon prices consistent with those in our policy simulations. We consider results from the Global Timber Model (GTM) prepared for the Energy
Model Forum 21 at Stanford University (Sohngen and Sedjo, 2006) . 16 GTM is a dynamic partialequilibrium model that optimizes changes in deforestation, afforestation, and forest management across ten world regions, accounting for the competition between forests and agricultural uses. This model was used in the previous analysis based on WITCH by Tavoni, Sohngen, and Bosetti (2007) and is also used by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for its analyses of international forest carbon 15 Calvin et al. (2009) examine the implications of delayed participation in a climate policy regime for leakage and costs of reducing fossil fuel emission. Busch et al. (2009) examine the sensitivity of deforestation emission reductions and costs to alternative proposed systems for crediting national REDD efforts, accounting for the incentives for country participation and corresponding leakage. 16 These estimates are available at: http://www.stanford.edu/group/EMF/projects/group21/EMF21sinkspagenew.htm.
provisions in proposed U.S. climate legislation. We use the GTM EMF-21 estimates based on carbon prices rising at a real rate of 5% annually. This scenario approximates the exponential growth of carbon prices predicted by WITCH under the scenarios with banking, but will tend to overestimate REDD supply in the cases without banking, which result in a lower near-term and higher long-term price, as discussed in the next section. Although GTM predicts changes in forest management, afforestation, and biomass supply for bioenergy as a result of climate policies, we only include the estimates for reduced deforestation emissions.
As an alternative, we also incorporate estimated costs of reducing deforestation emissions from Optimization Model; GLOBIOM) that accounts for feedbacks between land allocation and the prices of land-based commodities. We use IIASA's estimates based on carbon prices rising at a cubic rate, as this set of runs was most consistent with our policy scenarios. In contrast to the GTM results, the cubic price path used by IIASA closely approximates the carbon price trajectory predicted by WITCH under our scenarios without banking, while relatively underestimating REDD potential in the scenarios with banking, which result in higher near-term and lower long-term carbon prices. 17 While the IIASA model cluster like GTM also estimates afforestation/reforestation and forest biomass for bioenergy, we only incorporate the results for reduced deforestation.
These models differ in the baseline (business-as-usual) levels of forestry emissions as well as in the estimated costs and quantities of available reductions.
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The varying baselines arise from differences in the underlying data on land use and carbon, assumptions over deforestation drivers, and regional coverage (see Kindermann et al., 2008 , for a comparison of the global models). We account for these differences by adjusting the business-as-usual land-use emissions in WITCH to be consistent with each REDD scenario. In contrast, the GTM model projects baseline net global emissions remaining roughly constant at 0.2 Gt/year throughout the century. 19 The WHRC bases its estimates on a constant extrapolation of historic emissions from the Brazilian Amazon. We use this benchmark as the projection of business-as-usual Brazilian land-use emissions in WITCH, keeping projections for other regions the same. In the case of the GTM and IIASA estimates, the land sector emissions in WITCH are replaced by the projected business-as-usual net land-use emissions from these studies. 20 Kindermann et al. (2008) describe other differences between global models. Estimates from GTM presented in Kindermann et al. and used in analyses by EPA (2009) are based on higher baseline emissions from deforestation that are closer to those from the IIASA cluster model estimates. As noted above, we focus on the GTM estimates from the EMF 21 runs as these are based on rising, rather than constant, price scenarios and thus most consistent with the policy incentives modeled with WITCH.
Although limited to the Brazilian Amazon, the Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC) modeling estimates significant potential reductions from deforestation as the estimated opportunity costs of avoiding deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon are lower than those from the global models.
One reason for the lower costs is that the global models incorporate price feedbacks, with avoided deforestation efforts raising the global market price of agricultural land, thus making reductions in deforestation more costly. Another reason is that WHRC considers timber revenues from sustainable forest management as a benefit from conserving forests, in contrast to the GTM and IIASA models where this is not necessarily the case. The WHRC estimates assume constant baseline emissions from deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon of 916 million tons of CO 2 per year and estimate that 570 million tons would be reduced for less than $11 in 2010, with costs rising sharply thereafter. In 2030, WHRC estimates reductions of 760 and 800 million tons for opportunity costs less than $11 and $24 per ton, respectively.
Finally, we note some additional limitations of the study. We do not consider other potentially significant forest sector mitigation opportunities from afforestation/reforestation and changes in forestry plantation management, which could be important in both Annex 1 and tropical and nontropical developing countries. For simplicity, we do not consider potential interactions between the forest and energy sectors, other than the trading of REDD credits on the carbon market. We do not consider the potentially important impacts of climate policy for bioenergy demand and the consequences for deforestation. Similarly, we do not model interactions between deforestation and emissions from agriculture, which could be especially important in terms of non-CO 2 gases. Potential feedbacks between the climate and forests, which could affect both emissions and mitigation potential, were also beyond the scope of this study.
Policy Scenarios
The basic policy scenario, rather than stemming from purely scientific and economic concerns (e.g., optimal path for stabilization of GHGs), draws from what appears to be a potentially realistic set of targets for broad groups of countries. We consider industrialized countries adopting binding commitments to reduce emissions initially and developing countries accepting commitments at a later date. By then tuning the level of effort during the second half the century, we construct a scenario that approximately stabilizes atmospheric concentrations around 550 ppmv CO 2 equivalent by the end of the century. This is at the less ambitious end of the 450-550 ppmv stabilization range considered by Stern (2008) as necessary to avoid dangerous human interference with the climate under the mandate of the UNFCCC. We are conservative (but we believe realistic) in our assumptions about the targets that the global community may be able to agree upon and explore how such targets could potentially be tightened with the aid of REDD. We also focus on assessing how market-based REDD could dampen incentives for technology innovation. Less ambitious global targets reduce the need for emissions reductions and thus provide greater scope for detecting the potential suppression of key technologies, such as carbon capture and storage. The basic policy architecture is depicted in Table 1 . concentrations around 535 ppmv CO 2 equivalent and is estimated to limit the mean global temperature rise to less than 2.5º C below preindustrial levels. The IPCC estimates that constraining temperature rise to less than 1.6-2.6º C above preindustrial levels provides a significant reduction of climate risks, including melting of the Greenland Ice sheet and turning the terrestrial system into a net carbon source To examine the impact of linking REDD to the carbon market, we run variations of the basic policy scenario with and without availability of reduced deforestation as a mitigation option, using each of the three estimates of REDD costs and potential described in the previous section. In these scenarios, credits from reduced emissions from deforestation are freely fungible with permits for emissions in other sectors. We also consider the flexibility to trade emission permits across time, which most recent analyses of REDD and carbon markets have not considered. Banking is implemented in WITCH by allowing each region to flexibly bank or borrow permits in order to minimize the costs of meeting the cumulative carbon emissions constraint determined by its targets through 2100. 22 The role of banking is highlighted by running two variations of each of our scenarios: one fully allowing the flexibility of banking and the second not allowing any banking at all.
To explore the potential role of REDD and technological innovation as a hedge against a future need to tighten climate targets, we consider an additional set of scenarios that continue as in the base case through 2050, at which point the global community adopts a more stringent climate target. The more stringent target is assumed to require the strictest policy that WITCH predicts is feasible as of that point in time, which achieves GHG concentrations of approximately 515 ppmv CO 2 equivalent by 2100. We run this scenario both with and without REDD, focusing, for simplicity, on the REDD cost curves from IIASA. model. Each of these variations is also modeled with and without anticipation of the new emissions targets. By this we mean the following. 'With anticipation' represents the extreme case of optimal anticipation when the new target is perfectly foreseen by market actors. We maintain the assumption of forward-looking behavior so the scenarios reveal the optimal response to the tighter future target. 'Without anticipation' represents the other extreme of no anticipation when market 22 Borrowing of future credits for use in early periods is technically possible in the model but is not observed in practice as the rising stringency of the emissions targets over time makes borrowing economically unprofitable. Allowing banking over the entire period of the emission constraints avoids inconsistencies in other approaches (e.g. EPA 2009) where a terminal banking year is imposed while the climate policy still continues.
participants follow the optimal response to the original target up until 2050 and only then adjust the trajectory in response to the tighter emission requirements. These scenarios illustrate the potential impacts of interactions between REDD and technological innovation when there is uncertainty over future policy. 
Discussion of Results
The main results concerning the role of REDD in the abatement portfolio and the resulting effects on deforestation and climate policy costs are summarized in Table 2 . REDD represents a relatively important although declining source of overall global abatement, particularly when banking enables the world to take greater advantage of higher availability of REDD and other cost-effective opportunities in the early periods. The global estimates differ in terms of costs, quantities, and regional distribution of potential, but yield similar aggregate patterns of REDD. In the case with banking, based on the estimates from the GTM and IIASA models, respectively, REDD represents between a 19% and 20% share of cumulative abatement by 2020, falling to about 9% by 2050 and 4% for both models by the end of the century. In contrast, without banking, the contribution of REDD is less than half as much over the first decades and slightly lower over the century, representing 3.2% and 7.9% of cumulative global abatement by 2020, 7.5% and 7.2% by 2050, and 3.5% and 3.6% by 2100 for the GTM and IIASA models, respectively.
When the WHRC Brazil estimates are examined, reducing deforestation emissions is still a significant source of abatement and actually represents a larger share of total abatement in the case without rather than with banking. This is because REDD from just Brazil is estimated to be a relatively cost-effective source of abatement in the early years which, given its more limited scale, is largely pursued even without banking. In this Brazil-only case, REDD represents 5.6% (9.4%) 2.9% (3.1%) and 1.6% (1/6%) share of cumulative abatement by 2020, 2050, and 2100 with (and without banking).
As noted earlier, modeling the leakage or displacement of deforestation emissions to other parts of the world would reduce the estimated contribution of a Brazil-only REDD scenario.
The flexibility to better optimize the timing of abatement through banking shifts forward the time profile of abatement and this is especially the case when REDD is available. For example, in the IIASA case without banking, 22.6% of abatement this century is achieved by 2050, both with and without REDD as a mitigation option. In contrast, when banking is permitted, the share of the abatement achieved by 2050 rises to 24.1% and 23.9% in the case with and without REDD, respectively. The higher initial effort when banking is allowed reveals the suboptimal timing of abatement when the path of reductions is just fixed to a realistic set of reduction commitments, without considering the profit-maximizing timing of activities by market participants. In the base case, without REDD and without banking, the permit price is estimated to begin around $4/tCO 2 equivalent in 2010, rising sharply, to $36 by 2020 and to almost $400 by 2050. When banking is allowed, the price trajectory is flattened, with higher prices in the early years and lower prices in the later years (see Figure 3) . 23 With banking, the price rises to $87 over 2015-19 but only to $330 over 2045-49. 24 The availability of REDD mitigation moderates the level of prices, as reported in Table 3 .
In the no-banking case, REDD has negligible impacts on the price prior to 2020 as other abatement opportunities are relatively plentiful and the quantities of international trading are restricted. However, the price falls by an estimated 11%, 26%, 20% in 2045-49 and 12%, 22%, and 25% in 2095-99 in the 23 An intertemporally optimal stabilization pathway implies a carbon price rising at the rate of interest. In WITCH, the return on capital is determined endogenously in each region and time period. With banking, the global carbon price rises at a global average rate of interest in each period, converging to the pure rate of time preference over the long run. 24 Estimates of stabilization costs computed applying WITCH are higher than those reported by IPCC (2007b). Marginal abatement costs crucially depend on assumptions about availability and penetration of carbon free technologies in the electric and non electric sectors. This is particularly true for more stringent scenarios where almost complete decarbonization of the economy is required by the end of the century. In WITCH multiple carbon free alternatives are modeled for the electricity sector, whereas new technologies become competitive in the non electricity sectors only through large investments in R&D. In addition, the diffusion processes for new technologies are modeled in order to mimic the time required in order to undertake the extensive infrastructural changes. Finally, WITCH features a non-cooperative representation of knowledge creation and diffusion processes. All these factors are at the basis of these higher estimates.
Brazil-only, GTM, and IIASA cases respectively. When banking is available, prices are higher from the beginning due to greater demand for abatement. This 'when-flexibility' allows REDD to consistently lower the carbon price trajectory throughout the century. Indeed, with banking, REDD lowers prices by about 8-23% in each of the periods 2015-19, 2045-49 and 2095-99 (see Table 3 ).
The estimated effect of linking REDD to a global carbon market is to reduce global deforestation emissions significantly and rapidly (see the middle set of rows in Table 2 ). In the banking cases, 
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The basic policy without REDD results in cumulative Global World Product (GWP) losses over 2010-2099 of 2.5% (1.8%) at a 3% (5%) discount rate. 26 The added flexibility in the timing of abatement due to banking lowers these losses to 2.1% (1.6%) at a 3% (5%) discount rate. Despite the restrictions on overall trading and the modest relative contribution to total global abatement, REDD decreases the estimated costs of meeting a global climate target, with the impact depending on the estimated potential and the availability of banking. As shown in Table 2 , in the case without banking, REDD lowers overall policy costs for the century by 11%, 24%, and 22% based on the WHRC-Brazil, GTM, and IIASA estimates, respectively. Furthermore, irrespective of REDD, policy costs are lower 25 The regional distribution of this value varies by model. Under banking, the IIASA estimates imply that Latin America, Asia, and Africa receive 79%, 13%, and 9% of the market value, respectively, compared to 40%, 31% and 29% based on GTM. 26 These results are robust to which forestry and land-use model's estimated business-as-usual emissions are used to set the WITCH land-use emissions baseline as described in section 2.2.
when banking is allowed. With banking, REDD reduces the costs by 10%, 21% and 23% in the WHRC-Brazil, GTM, and IIASA cases, respectively. 27 These estimated effects of a global REDD scenario have a greater impact on policy costs than those implied by the availability/absence of different carbon-free and low carbon technologies, as documented in different publications (e.g. Bosetti et al. 2009 ).
The cost-savings from introducing REDD indicate that a more stringent target is feasible for the same costs as in the case without REDD. Focusing on the IIASA case, we simulate a series of more stringent scenarios in which we escalate proportionally all regional efforts during the second part of the century. In this way, we identify a scenario with equivalent costs to the basic policy scenario without REDD, producing a 2.5% estimated decline in Global World Product (GWP). This exercise suggests that allowing the link with REDD makes is possible to achieve a scenario resulting in 20 ppmv of CO 2 -equivalent below the base policy case for the same amount of discounted costs. 27 The gains in policy costs measured in discounted terms depend on the choice of the discount rate, even though only marginally, as a large part of the cost reduction accrues during the first part of the century. Here we are using a discount rate of 5%, but if we were to choose a 3% discount rate, the cost savings would be increased to 11%, 21%, and 25% in the three cases with banking. We now turn to the effect of REDD on technology development in the energy sector. Our results indicate a generally negative but modest overall effect of REDD on energy technology R&D and lowcarbon technology investments, although we also find small positive impacts for some particular technology categories (see Table 4 showing the base policy case, without banking). The effect of REDD on innovation and technology investments and resulting innovation follows two channels. On one side, REDD makes it possible to attain the stabilization target while slightly relaxing the pressure to reduce energy emissions. In particular, REDD allows for a 2%, 8% and 10% increase in the cumulative emissions from the energy sector over 2010-2049 in the WHRC-Brazil, GTM, and IIASA REDD scenarios, respectively. Figure 4 shows how REDD slightly reduces the need for improvements in carbon efficiency both in 2030 and 2050, which expands the market for fossil fuel technologies, compared to the case without mitigation from REDD. Under BAU, energy efficiency is estimated to improve slightly , while carbon efficiency is estimated to progressively decline relative to the past 30 years, primarily due to the increase in he use of coal in developing countries. Irrespective of REDD, both energy and carbon efficiency improve dramatically under the climate policy cases. By granting some leeway to the fossil fuel sector, linking REDD to the carbon market decreases investments in the development of renewable (wind and solar) and nuclear energy sources; as well as in energy-intensity R&D. The estimated investment reductions are on the order of 3-10% in the global scenarios compared to the non-REDD climate policy case. The order of magnitude is modest relative to the substantial estimated increases in all these investments as a result of the climate policy, regardless of REDD, compared to the no-policy case (ranging from 60 to 80% for solar/wind and energy-intensity R&D).
While there is a tradeoff between relaxing the constraint on energy sectors emissions and investments in renewable, nuclear, and energy-intensity R&D, a different story holds true for investments in integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plus carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. This technology is not entirely carbon-free given an estimated emissions capture rate of 90%. For this reason, relaxing the cap on energy emissions improves the economic competitiveness of the IGCC plus CCS option. Over the medium run, investments in IGCC plus CCS technologies thus expand slightly from the introduction of REDD (on the order of 1% in the global scenarios, as shown in Table 4 ). The second channel through which REDD affects the estimated patterns of energy technology investments is via the impact on fossil fuel prices. Because REDD permits greater flexibility in reducing fossil fuel consumption, the prices of fossil fuels, particularly oil, are slightly higher under the REDD versus no-REDD policy scenarios. This increases the relative profitability of investments in alternative carbon-free technologies in the non-electricity sector and boosts the R&D efforts to make these alternative technologies competitive. This second channel interacts with the first in determining the optimal level of R&D in non-electric breakthrough technologies which compete with oil in the transportation sector. Thus, the overall estimated effect of REDD on non-electric R&D is either very modestly negative or positive (in the cases with and without banking, respectively).
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the relatively modest effect on innovation investments for renewables and total energy R&D, focusing on the policy cases without banking. While negative, both the effects on energy intensity R&D and carbon-free technologies investments, are modest compared to the leap in investment spurred by climate policy (see the no-policy BAU case for comparison). The assumption of perfect foresight and the increasing emissions reduction required by the policy architecture call for significant investments in new technologies and REDD only moderately decreases the required effort. Let us now consider the case of a tightening of targets in the future (potentially in response to new information about possible damages from climate change). As noted earlier we have two cases: one where these alternative policy targets are anticipated and one where they are not. When the policy targets are anticipated, the effect of REDD on innovation is greatly reduced. In particular, focusing on the IIASA no-banking case, if we consider a scenario where global emissions reductions are increased after 2050 to achieve 20 ppmv less by 2100, then REDD implies a reduction in nuclear investments over the first half of the century of 1%, rather than 6.6%. Similarly, the decrease in wind and solar investments falls from about 7% to less than 4% while the contraction of energy intensity R&D falls from over 9% to less than 7%.
The interaction between REDD, technology innovation, and banking determine the ability of the global economy to respond to expected and unexpected increases in the stringency of climate policy.
Focusing on the case with banking and the REDD estimates from IIASA, Table 5 summarizes the loss of GWP under the scenarios where the stringency of global emissions reductions after 2050 is increased to achieve stabilization at 515 ppmv by 2100. When the tighter future policy targets are not anticipated, the introduction of REDD lowers investments in nuclear, solar and wind, and energyintensity-improving technologies prior to 2050 below the optimal levels achieved with full anticipation.
Nevertheless, we find that the total discounted climate policy costs over the century are still lower in the cases where REDD is available. This indicates that the reduction in technology investments is outweighed by the benefits from REDD when climate policy must be tightened at a future date. These benefits come from lower costs incurred prior to 2050 as well as lower costs incurred after 2050, compared to the case without REDD.
The lower costs incurred after 2050 with REDD are principally the result of the cushion provided by the additional abatement achieved through REDD as a result of banking over the first part of the century. Even in the no anticipation case, when banking is available, the availability of REDD leads to greater emissions reductions achieved prior to 2050. This provides a head start on meeting a tighter target after 2050, which means that fewer reductions are needed over the second half of the century.
The banked abatement provides increased flexibility, dampening the costs of the unexpected increase in policy stringency. As a result of the banked abatement achieved with REDD in the first part of the century, even in the case with no anticipation, the estimated policy costs after 2050 are still lower in a case where REDD is only available through 2050 versus the case with no REDD at all. Overall, when there is no anticipation and the discount rate is 3% (5%), the loss of GWP is -2.8% (-4.5%) with REDD only before 2050 versus -3.1% (-4.8%) with no REDD at all. Anticipation of the future target combined with REDD provides the ability to combine greater investments in REDD together with a larger and more optimal portfolio of other activities, including additional technology investments earlier in the century. This leads to greater proportional benefits from both policy foresight and from REDD. At a 3% discount rate, the estimates in Table 5 indicate that, the availability of REDD lowers the policy costs by 27% without anticipation but 30% with anticipation. Similarly, at a 3% discount rate, optimal anticipation lowers the costs by 3% without REDD versus 7.5% with REDD, compared to the cases without anticipation. 28 This suggests that the opportunities created by REDD are synergistic with strategies to maintain policy flexibility when there is a risk of tighter future emission reduction targets. a All these scenarios involve the maximum feasible policy tightening after 2050, which results in stabilization at 515 ppmv by 2100. These scenarios all include banking and use the IIASA model estimates of REDD potential. When there is no anticipation, mitigation actions prior to 2050 do not reflect any anticipation of the policy tightening. This contrasts with the optimal choice of mitigation activities when the tightening is completely foreseen under the optimal anticipation case. 28 With zero discounting, the benefits of cost savings later in the century become more apparent in both the REDD and anticipation cases. In contrast, at a 5% discount rate, total discounted costs are actually higher or the same in the cases with versus without anticipation, as the cost savings later in the century are discounted by more than the return on investment in the WITCH model. 
Conclusions
Efficient policies to address climate change over the long-term will minimize the costs of reducing emissions while preserving flexibility to adapt to new circumstances that may require course corrections over time. This paper analyzes the effects of linking credits for reductions in emissions from tropical deforestation (e.g. REDD) to a global carbon market. The analysis is based on a dynamic integrated assessment framework, which explicitly models induced technological change in the energy sector. We incorporate expected patterns of global participation as well as institutional features considered likely, such as limits on initial international trading and potential for permit banking, and also use scenarios to explore the effect of REDD on policy flexibility to tighten targets in the future.
Our research confirms that integrating REDD into global carbon markets can provide significant incentives for reducing deforestation while lowering the costs of global climate change protection. We find that the cost savings from REDD have only modest tradeoffs in terms of reduced clean energy innovation. Including REDD as a mitigation option generally reduces investments in cleaner energy technologies over the next four decades, by a maximum of 10% in the case of energyintensity R&D investments. This crowding out effect is not uniform across technologies, and REDD provides a small estimated boost to the development of some non-electric as well as fossil-based technologies, including IGCC-CCS. Moreover, while reduced clean energy innovation could in principle hinder future efforts to reduce emissions, our estimates suggest a positive net effect of REDD on the ability to adopt more stringent policies by the middle of the century. In particular, synergies between REDD and the possibility of banking provide a head start on climate mitigation that lower the costs of more ambitious targets that may be needed in the future.
Despite the initial limitations on REDD trading, introducing REDD lowers the total costs of the stabilization policy over this century by an estimated 10-23% depending on different model estimates for reductions from only the Brazilian Amazon as well as all tropical regions. By the same token, we explored an increasingly stringent scenario to the point where costs with REDD matched those of the basic policy scenarios without REDD. We find that REDD could enable additional reductions of approximately 20 ppmv of CO 2 -equivalent by the end of the century with no added discounted costs with respect to the basic policy case. When banking is allowed, the cost savings from REDD are magnified if there is a need to increase the stringency of global climate policy in the future. By providing lower cost mitigation in the first few decades, the availability of REDD enables greater overcompliance and credit banking. The earlier start on mitigation generates a hedge that reduces the aggregate cost burden from greater emissions reductions required in the middle of the century. The introduction of REDD lowers total costs even when the policy tightening is completely unexpected, but benefits are largest when the tightening is anticipated such that mitigation activities as well as technology investments can be optimized accordingly. These estimates suggest that early use of REDD and other sources of low-cost near-term mitigation could have important risk-hedging benefits for both firms and society overall, as suggested by Golub et al (2009a) , especially if market participants at least partially anticipate and act to hedge against such risks.
Our estimated cost savings from REDD are broadly consistent with those reported in earlier studies. This is in spite the fact that we are more conservative in the number of forestry mitigation options that can be credited on the market and in the share of emission targets that countries can cover with REDD and other international credits during the first phase of the agreement. Our results indicate that global REDD contributes about 9% to 7% of total cumulative global abatement through the first half of the century, with and without banking. This is lower than Tavoni, Sohngen and Bosetti's (2007) estimate that non-OECD and global forests could, respectively, contribute one -quarter and onethird of cost-effective abatement by mid century, with forestry overall defraying the costs of 50 ppmv additional reductions by 2100. The large potential for forestry found in their analysis builds partly on the moderate target they consider (550 ppmv CO 2 -only compared to roughly 450 ppmv CO 2 -only in our base policy case) and partly on their assumption of full availability of mitigation opportunities from avoided deforestation plus afforestation, reforestation and changes in forest plantation management worldwide. Our estimates also indicate a lower, though similarly declining, share of abatement from global forestry compared to most of the modeling results conduced for EMF-21 ).
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The larger estimates in these studies may also be due to their modeling of a less-stringent stabilization target, of an optimal policy scenario, and of a broader range of forest mitigation activities worldwide.
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Results from our different scenarios indicate that policy costs, carbon prices, and technological innovation depend critically on the possibility of banking, both with and without REDD. To recall, previous studies estimated the savings in costs from REDD in the range 30-50% for 2020 and 2030.
We find cost savings in the range 7-20% prior to 2050, depending on the scale of REDD and the possibility of banking. Our lower estimates of costs savings are probably due to our modeled restrictions (which we consider plausible) on REDD trading prior to 2020 as well as differences in the forestry models and climate targets. In terms of the price of carbon, previous models that have not When banking is considered, we estimate the price would decline by 7-23%, depending on the scenario for Brazil-only or global REDD. Our global REDD results with banking are in the range of the 18% and 22% estimates of USCAP (2009) and Murray, Lubowski, and Sohngen (2009) , respectively..
We find that REDD generally reduces the portfolio of investments and R&D of lower-carbon energy technologies by about 1-10%, depending on the REDD estimates and policy case. These effects 29 A notable exception where global forests are a smaller share of cumulative abatement by mid century, which then rises over time, is the set of EMF-21 estimates from the MESSAGE model, where biomass electricity coupled with carbon capture and storage becomes an important mitigation strategy that competes for forest lands . 30 Different studies reported in Rose et al. (2008) estimate larger contributions from forestry mitigation options, including reduced deforestation, on the order of 11-55% by mid century based on targets of 650 ppmv CO 2 e (versus 535 ppmv CO 2 e in our analysis), although the estimate falls to 1-2% in the MESSAGE model that considers land competition for bioenergy feedstocks coupled with carbon capture and storage. 31 The lower and upper ends of these estimates correspond to Eliasch 2008 and Dixon et al. 2009, respectively. are relatively modest compared to the overall impacts of the policy versus no-policy cases, regardless of REDD. Our estimated effects span a broader range than those reported in the study by Tavoni, Sohngen, and Bosetti (2007) , which correspond to upper end of our energy-intensity R&D impacts.
We also identify varying effects by different classes of technology. Notably, by relaxing the limits on fossil fuel emissions, linking REDD to the carbon market slightly increases investments in integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plus carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies, which are estimated to increase slightly (0.1-1.4%) as a result of REDD. We find that REDD provides flexibility that lowers demand for mitigation in the energy sector, thus allowing slightly larger investments in fossil energy technologies. This in turn marginally raises fossil fuel prices, especially oil, increasing the relative competitiveness of alternative carbon free technologies in the non-electric sector. These results support the findings of Golub et al. (2008) 
